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Abstract: This paper examines the context of evidence-informed practice (EIP) by inquiring into how
educational practice is defined and organised, and how predominant understandings of educational
practice are concomitant with preferences for particular forms of evidence. This leads to discussion
of how certain educational research traditions speak (or are unable to speak) to these evidence
requirements, and how this shapes the nature of EIP. While the rise of EIP can be understood as part
of the increasing attention paid by governments to systemic ‘improvement’ in education systems,
it can be argued that the lack of a coherent body of educational knowledge in many national traditions
enables governments to exercise control not only of definitions of ‘what works’ in education but
also over conceptualisations of educational practice. For some policy makers and practitioners,
the much-remarked dislocation between ‘evidence’ and teaching practice in many national contexts
can only be solved by a narrowing of what counts as knowledge alongside a more prescriptive control
over what counts as acceptable educational judgement. However, such an alignment serves to exclude
wider educational purposes and arguably instrumentalises pedagogical relations. Meanwhile, some
continental European countries maintain traditions that may serve to mitigate such developments,
although these traditions are not without challenge.
Keywords: educational knowledge; educational practice; teacher professionalism
1. Introduction
How is educational practice conceived? And by whom? And with what results? Discussions
of practice abound in educational research, but there is often a lack of precision as to what we are
actually discussing—are we clear what ‘practice’ is when so many authors consider its meaning
‘unproblematic’, and use it ‘in very diverse ways’? [1] (p. 85). The implications for how we
conceptualise evidence-informed practice, and for how evidence and practice are related, are significant.
Furthermore, there is often a lack of attention in much educational literature to the thorny questions of
who or what shapes (or controls) this practice, and the extent to which it can be changed or transformed
by both those involved within the practice and those outside it. Arguably, these latter questions start
to intertwine with sociological questions of structure and agency or institutionalist questions that
seek to explain adaptation and isomorphism in human and organisational activity [2], much as they
could also be seen as intertwined with the exercise of power through discourse (e.g., via Foucault),
or through capital or field positioning (e.g., via Bourdieu). ‘Practice’ can be seen as constituted and
re-constituted through micro and macro political and sociological dynamics. We cannot just assume it
is constituted in any particular way in any discussion of educational change and reform. Without an
awareness of the varied understandings that can be loaded into ‘practice’ as a phenomenon, we are in
danger of being taken off unwittingly into conceptualisations of the world which may be inaccurate,
biased, or suit particular political agendas.
This paper enquires into how educational practice can be defined and organised, and how
predominant understandings of educational practice lead to preferences for particular forms of
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evidence, with consequences for how evidence-informed practice (EIP) is conceptualised. It is
argued that certain educational research traditions speak to these evidence requirements while
others are unable to, and this shapes the nature of evidence-informed practice (EIP). It is asserted
that the lack of a coherent body of educational knowledge in many national education traditions
enables governments to exercise control not only of definitions of ‘what works’ in education but also
over conceptualisations of educational practice. This can then lead to a narrowing of what counts
as educational knowledge alongside a more prescriptive control over what counts as acceptable
educational judgement, potentially excluding wider educational purposes, instrumentalising
pedagogical relations, and deprofessionalising teachers. While these developments are particularly
prevalent in Anglophone contexts, attention is drawn to some European educational traditions that may
serve to mitigate such developments, although these traditions are not without challenge themselves.
2. The Emergence and Recent use of the Idea of Practice in Education
How has ‘practice’ as a phenomenon emerged from philosophical and sociological work?
Hager [1] shows that theorists of practice draw on distinct philosophical and sociological traditions:
Prominent theorists are said to be indebted to Aristotle, Heidegger, or Wittgenstein, or to frame practice
as a phenomenon within a broader social theory (i.e., Bourdieu or Giddens). Rouse has argued that
there are two principal schools of thought in the definition of practice: On the one hand those that are
‘regularist’ or ‘regulist’, and on the other the ‘normative’ tradition [3] (p. 48). The regularist or regulist
traditions see practice as relating to habituated patterns of activity, or presuppositions (e.g., drawing on
Bourdieu, but also certain strands of philosophical work such as that of Heidegger and Wittgenstein),
and therefore encompassing a very wide range of purposive (and possibly non-purposive) human
activity. However, the normative tradition requires practices to have agreed purposes, communities,
and criteria of excellence [1,4,5], against which activity can be normatively evaluated (see also [6,7]),
and this tends to owe more to Aristotelian work. Rouse highlights the ‘complex relations of mutual
interaction’, a sense that there is something at ‘issue and at stake’ in the practice, and an agreement
that any ‘resolution’ of issues is ‘always prospective’ [3] (pp. 50–51), accepting that the practice may be
subject to continual change and adaptation as new revelations and understandings emerge.
Those who have worked with the regularist and regulist traditions of practice theory have sought
to use the idea of practice to build new lenses to understand the social world, and to explore the
ways in which the social, the material, and the physical articulate [8]. Schatzki emphasises the ‘shared
embodied know-how’, ‘shared practical understandings’, and ‘tacit knowledges and presuppositions’
that constitute the ‘arrays of activity’ [9] (pp. 11–12) that can be identified as practices. Nicolini suggests
that most practice theories ‘see the world as a seamless assemblage, nexus, or confederation of
practices’, and involve the study of ‘routine bodily activities’ on the ‘horizon of intelligible action’
available to practitioners [8] (p. 3). Such approaches can lead to an all-encompassing view of practice,
and to a specific focus on the character of micro-level activities as practices. The consequence can be
difficulties with finding grounds for differentiating between types or categories of practice.
Drawing on MacIntyre’s work [4], Hager has sketched out a normative approach to practice that
is useful for considering what might be distinctive about occupational and socially purposive practices,
by identifying the complex relationship between internal and external goods produced in practice [5].
He argues that the tangible external goods produced by purposive practices (i.e., a building resulting
from the practices of construction or architecture) are inextricable from the internal goods of the
practice. Noddings, also engaging with MacIntyre’s work, has argued that teaching is a ‘relational’
practice generating internal goods ‘directed primarily toward the growth of students’ [10] (p. 250).
Teachers’ activities can therefore be evaluated normatively, providing a community of teachers (or
educational practitioners) has established criteria by which the internal goods can be judged. It is
important to note that MacIntyre is sceptical about conceptualising teaching as a practice, preferring to
see teaching and learning as elements of activity that take place as part of other normative practices [4].
Those writing about practices are not always inclined to fully explore the relationship between the
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‘normative’ and the ‘regularist’, although it could be suggested that normative traditions can help
explain why certain habituated activities sustain over time and why some fall apart, unable to agree
on a meaningful purpose to which they are directed [11]. The normative focus on consensually
agreed purposes, the development of criteria of excellence, and practitioner mutual accountability are
therefore important areas of investigation for those interested in practices.
Practice theories are used extensively in studies of professional and workplace learning [12],
often building on the work of Lave and Wenger [13] or influenced by Cultural Historical Activity
Theory (CHAT), and have seeped into work on teacher education and professional development (i.e.,
on Professional Learning Communities (PLCs)) [14]. However, much literature on school improvement
and teacher learning falls back on conceptualising a separation between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, with
practice being related primarily to what educators do in their workplace settings (i.e., including
teaching in schools, making judgements in the course of classroom interaction etc.), while theory is often
related to knowledge produced external to the practice by research organisations and academics [15].
Moreover, the separation between the two is also relied upon to some extent in discussions of the
sociology of educational and professional knowledge, e.g., Furlong and Whitty [16] and Young and
Muller [17], echoing long-standing tensions in educational discourse [7].
Such a conceptual separation between theory and practice is popular, and may be useful
analytically, but can be challenged from a number of angles, including by practice theorists.
Normative thinkers could argue that the distinction is misplaced and that ‘theory’ (or a form of
symbolic understanding) should be seen as generated within a practice to constitute the criteria of
excellence by which activity seeking to contribute to the practice could be evaluated. Without such
criteria, the practice ceases to be sustainable and dissolves into disconnected individual activities.
However, the criteria themselves can only be constituted through the practice, or by acquaintance with
and engagement in practice activities—the ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ are thus inseparable, interwoven,
and mutually constituted. What this leaves open is questions about how the practice adapts to new
knowledge that has emerged outwith the practice that may have bearing upon the practice. On the
other hand, practice theorists working within a regularist tradition could also seek to challenge the
separation between theory and practice, arguing that what we think of as theory is just the outcome
of one form of privileged practice (i.e., academic practice). All practices generate forms of knowing
and being, some of which crystallise into explicit theories. Much of what could be theory is therefore
situated, tacit, or embedded within phronetic wisdom [18].
But to what extent do these debates register with contemporary discussions of evidence-informed
practice? The May 2017 Interim issue of Impact, the new journal published by the Chartered College
of Teaching (a new professional body for schoolteachers in England), had a particular focus on
‘perspectives on evidence-informed education’ and sought to make the case for ‘connecting research
and practice’ [19] (p. 1). Many of the contributions published in the issue maintain a distinction between
‘theory’ and ‘practice’, provide only a rudimentary discussion of practice itself, and align themselves
with the belief that there needs to be a ‘double transformation’ [20] (p. 2), both of educational research
and educational practice, in the name of ‘improvement’. Indeed, this can be understood in terms
of the ambition for the new journal, which is to ‘have a tangible effect on classroom practice and,
subsequently, on the outcomes of young people’ [19] (p. 1). The introduction promises articles that
‘explore the question of what we mean by evidence-informed practice’ and includes a final section in
which teachers explain how they have ‘implemented a concept from a piece of published education
research in their practice’ [19] (p. 1). There is discussion of ‘summarising the best available evidence
in practitioner-relevant forms’ and the importance of ‘translation into effective practice’ [21] (p. 7).
There is an assumption throughout many contributions that educational practice can be transformed
and improved through contact with ‘high-quality research and relevant examples’, with an ‘expectation’
that ‘its application can improve education’ [22] (p. 5). Rather than have excellence criteria generated
normatively through the practice itself by a body of practitioners, as MacIntyre [4] or Hager’s [5]
works might suggest, it is for the arbitrators of the ‘best available evidence’ to provide the ‘tools’ so
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that ‘decision makers’ can use ‘goal theory’ to transform practice. The underlying assumption is that
practitioners need to be enlightened: The ‘normalisation of evidence-informed education must be the
intention to be implemented’ [22] (pp. 5–6).
The views expressed in that first (interim) issue of Impact have parallels in other prominent
recent published work on evidence-informed practice [23]. What is noticeable about these approaches
is the extent to which ‘theory’ (or evidence) and ‘practice’ are conceived as distinct and subject
to different processes. Rather than emphasise a need for ‘practice’ (and therefore practitioners) to
generate and maintain criteria of excellence that are owned by a mutually accountable community
(see discussion below), there is instead an explicit claim or implicit assumption that practice needs
to be transformed (and will be transformed) by the ‘best available evidence’. This is often backed up
by data that is said to demonstrate that attainment can be improved through certain approaches to
school organisation, management, and pedagogical strategy, e.g., [24]. Disregarding other broader
purposes of education [25,26], it is assumed that current educational practice is often flawed and in
need of redemption, on the basis of measurements about attainment in specific areas, and that gold
standard research evidence can reform it. It is noticeable, for example, that Nelson and Campbell’s [23]
brief discussion of definitions of evidence-informed practice focuses primarily on defining ‘evidence’,
rather than ‘practice’, before a more detailed discussion of the differences between ‘evidence-based,
research-based, or evidence-informed’ approaches [23] (p. 128). Practice is seen as something upon
which evidence should have ‘impact’, notwithstanding acknowledgement that practice itself generates
evidence, and therefore it is the organisation and ‘integration’ of different forms of evidence, and their
‘mobilisation’ and measurability that become central concerns of interested academics and policy
actors [23] (pp. 131–132).
3. How Could and Should Practice be Organised?
It could also be persuasively argued that how practice is conceptualised has considerable bearings
on how we think practice could and should be organised and controlled. A normative position implies
control of practice consensually through a community of practitioners [4]. This can be described
as a process of mutual accountability that has parallels with notions of disciplinarity through peer
interaction and a distinctive professional logic [3,27,28] or knowledge-based professionalism [17,29].
Without fora through which practitioners can agree on the standards by which practice activity can
be normatively evaluated to iteratively produce internal and external goods, there is no ‘practice’.
Thus, practitioners themselves must have sufficient control in order to set and adapt norms, but the
body of practitioners must be comprised of those who are committed to sustaining and developing
the criteria of excellence of the practice. We can therefore perceive a requirement not only for
practitioners to be capable of critical reflection (based upon scholarship and research activity), but also
for scholar-researchers to be in some sense practitioners—to be fully part of a practice community
focused purposefully on the practice itself, and cognisant of its objectives and relations with other
practices. Arguably, this normative approach has historically underpinned the organisation of many of
the classical professions (e.g., Medicine or Architecture), which have required practitioners to strongly
identify with the profession and its objectives [28].
On the other hand, a regularist conception of practice makes no such stipulation about practitioner
influence on the character of the practice. Practice activities are those which currently occur,
and attention is turned to the activities that ‘hang together’ in a given architecture or those that
are habituated and routine [8,9]. There is no necessity for normative questions to be raised in regularist
understandings of practice (although they may be). Instead, the emphasis is often on sophisticated
description of the practice activities, drawing on ethnographic traditions and other forms of fieldwork,
or the development of sophisticated analytical frameworks that seek to interpret the relationships
between elements of the practice [8]. The outcome of this is that such conceptualisations allow
for activities to be labelled ‘practices’ in which practitioners have no or limited control over the
activities in which they participate, whereas in a normative tradition they would not be considered
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as such. There is no requirement for the generation of internal or external goods [4], or normative
standard-setting if regularities are enough to be considered practices, although these may nevertheless
arise. Indeed, notions of normativity could be seen by some practice theorists as expressions of
hierarchy or the selective imposition of values by dominant groups.
For some who publically advocate EIP in education, a version of the normative version of practice
seems at first glance closest to their view of educational practice, as a clear purpose to practice seems
important, but this normative vision is not characterised by mutual accountability or practitioners’
participation in the definition and management of the practice. Instead, it rests upon a preconceived
vision of what educational practice should involve, and arguably also a preconceived notion of the
purpose of education that may exclude important educational purposes [7,26,30]. The norms and
purposes of the practice are set outwith the practice, and thus practice communities are disempowered,
losing their capacity for change and adaptation. For advocates of EIP, the key purpose on which
evidence and practice must predominantly focus is ‘enhancing learning’, by improving ‘a measure
of attainment, derived from a robust assessment process’ [21] (pp. 7–9), although other contributory
purposes such as examining the introduction of ‘assertive discipline with the aim of improving students’
behaviour’ are also said to be important [21] (p. 9). The criteria of excellence, from which the norms
of the practice can be derived, are not derived through practitioner consensus. The experimental
methodology from which ‘best available evidence’ [21] (p. 7) is secured (i.e., ‘strong evidence from
well-run RCTs’) [31] (p. 15), provide the basis for the ‘outcome measures’ from which evaluation of
‘interventions’ can be determined [21] (pp. 7–8). Therefore, standards of excellence which will inform
how the practice will be judged are liable to be imposed upon the practice community. There is no
sense that the process of resolving issues is ‘prospective’, as Rouse suggests is central to normative
practices [3].
A system for organising the translation of evidence into practice lies at the crux of the current
version of EIP reforms, at least in England. The Education Endowment Foundation (EEF) has been
ordained by policy makers in England as an authority on educational research and its dissemination.
The Department for Education (DfE) 2015–2020 Strategy states that it is the ‘continued growth of the
Education Endowment Foundation’ that will provide the teaching profession with the ‘high-quality
evidence about ‘what works” [32] (p. 17), foregrounding the EEF as an arbitrator of the quality of
educational research. School leaders are directed towards a ‘teaching and learning toolkit’ which
provides summaries of evidence and ‘practical tools’ that are ‘designed to improve practice and
boost learning’ [33]. It is assumed that educational practice is about improving attainment in explicit,
measurable ways, and about ‘what works in raising the achievement of the poorest student’ [34] (p. 1).
It is further assumed that educational practice is improved by the provision of ‘evidence presented
crisply and cleanly, stripped of academic jargon, to inform their decision-making’ and that there is
a ‘real appetite among teachers and senior leaders’ for this evidence [34] (p. 2). Furthermore, it is
proudly stated that ‘more than half of senior leaders are using it (the evidence provided by the EEF) to
inform their own decision-making’ [34] (p. 1).
Norms are thus generated for educational practice not by the body of educational practitioners
per se, many of whom may hold different views of the purposes of education or the breadth of
ways in which students may achieve or progress, but by a network of educational policy actors
who are enacting a particular view of the purpose of education and the direction of educational
reform. Mutual accountability is irrelevant here—an (instrumental) technical view of teaching prevails,
in which teachers are informed of the ways in which they should improve their teaching by the research
(filtered according to a definition of quality set by the EEF and ultimately its chief funder, the DfE) [35].
While many of the aims of the EEF may be laudable, the consequence is a deprofessionalisation of
teaching. While being ‘evidence-informed’ may have value as part of ‘teacher professionalism’ [36] (p.
11), the benefits for professional autonomy and for education more generally only accrue if teachers
have greater control both over their practice community and over their knowledge base—they must
be able to exercise reflexively objective judgement in regards to the evidence and understand its
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provenance [30,37]. Arguably, this can only be done as part of a shared practice, together with higher
education practitioners. However, under current arrangements, teaching practice is subject to policy
control, and control by ‘senior leaders’ with their own views of ‘what works’, which increasingly may
be aligned with those of the EEF.
This prescribed model of practice is enabled by the evacuation of the structures of a genuinely
normative practice, ignoring requirements for commitments not only to ‘truth’ but also to ‘truthfulness’
in establishing normative criteria by which educational knowledge and practice can be judged [38].
Much academic research may be sidelined in such models of evidence-informed practice. It could be
argued, furthermore, that the weakening of normative conceptions of practice has been enabled
by the (nevertheless necessary) critiques offered by the Heidegger and Wittgenstein-influenced
views of practice [1], which have drawn attention to new manifestations of the exercise of power
and control, including through language. Such critiques highlight how normative conceptions of
practice and professionalism can be offered unwarranted discretion and autonomy as a consequence
of elite capture, and thus have strong parallels with work in the sociology of the professions [28,39].
However, to confuse the exposure of power dynamics with a nihilism about the value of a practice
based around a professional logic that can achieve public recognition is misguided [28]. It can be
argued that educational practice is of such importance to society that teaching must be considered a
professional practice requiring specialised knowledge and discretion, but this must be built around a
sense of purpose that has resonance amongst practitioners [6,29].
But what should the purpose of this practice be? There are a range of choices, but two principal
options can be sketched: The first could be a practice orientated primarily towards achieving
measurable improvements in achievement for pupils (i.e., as seems to be outlined in much discussion
of Evidence-Informed Practice). The second would be a practice with a commitment to exploring
deeper and broader conceptualisations of educational purpose, which might hold in balance aspects of
socialisation, qualification, and subjectification [26], or the ‘development of individual and collective
human virtues’, ‘the enhancement of civic life’, ‘economic productivity’, and ‘the furthering of social
equity and justice’ [25] (pp. 4–5). While the focus on measurable improvement leads to opportunities
for a preconception of the purpose of the practice (not necessarily by the practitioners themselves),
the second approach suggests much more scope for nuanced debate about educational purpose,
and recognition of the broad relationship between education and society. These two distinctly different
visions of educational practice suggest entirely different views of the relationship between evidence
and practice, and indeed what we mean by evidence itself.
4. How Understandings of Educational Practice are Concomitant with Certain Requirements
for Evidence
What do we mean by evidence in evidence-informed practice? And how does this relate to
educational knowledge and the professional expertise which we would hope teachers develop over
time? And what would this mean for how evidence-informed practice is configured and accounted
for? Winch identifies expertise as requiring not just a familiarity with propositional knowledge,
but also the capacity to make inferences between propositions and familiarity with the procedures for
establishing the validity of claims to knowledge, in addition to deep acquaintance with the context
of practice in which the expert is engaged [6]. The implication of this rounded view of expertise is
that practitioners, in order to become experts and make well-grounded judgements, require time
and guidance to develop their understanding of how propositions relating to their practice articulate,
in order to draw conclusions from a newly-encountered proposition. They require not only know-that,
but also special forms of know-how and knowledge by acquaintance. Importantly, expertise is also
seen as requiring the capacity to exercise judgement with a degree of autonomy. Practitioners who
have acquired a familiarity with expert propositional knowledge must also be acquainted with the
procedures for establishing that knowledge [6,17]. They must also be familiar with the relevance of
that knowledge for how they see and understand practice. For some, that expertise enables them to
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develop a lens which allows them to perceive a practice context differently from a layperson [11,37].
It also enables them to discriminate between activities which are not underpinned by expertise and
those that are.
However, the Winch model of expertise also suggests that a particular form of epistemic
community is required to support the development of expertise amongst practitioners [6].
A community is needed to establish procedures by which knowledge claims are judged, and to
maintain the epistemic memory of the practice. Practitioners within the community are needed to
review and evaluate new developments which may be proposed by individuals with much to gain
from their acceptance in the knowledge base. Here we see the value of Rouse’s discussion of ‘mutual
accountability’ and a set of established norms which form the basis for judgements which practitioners
must accept [3]. New ‘evidence’ is thus evaluated against existing propositions and the conceptual
web in which those propositions are located, to establish the import of the evidence concerned and its
bearing on existing understandings.
Prevailing views of evidence-informed practice do not, however, support the development
of this form of specialised expertise, or enable the mutual accountability through which claims to
knowledge (i.e., new evidence) should be handled (in a genuinely normative conception of practice).
The EEF does not seem to recognise the need for a mutually accountable body of expert practitioners
(i.e., a disciplinary community or an expert professional body) to judge new claims to knowledge.
Instead, the EEF has determined its vision of educational knowledge and practice, supported by
sympathetic academics working in empiricist traditions, and is now positioned to exert an increasingly
hegemonic hold on definitions of what is acceptable in terms of ‘evidence’ about education in England
through a promulgation of a ‘gold standard’ research approach.
Evidence, in this view, can be discreet (and free from ‘academic jargon’) [34], propositions which
can be summarised in the ‘learning and teaching toolkit’ for ‘implementation’ within the education
system. The evidence authorised by the EEF (or at least the research questions which have been
determined as priorities) are not open to challenge. Instead, the priority is now to move on to scale
up findings so that the (apparently much needed) transformation of educational practice can take
place. Thus, a specific (and comparatively narrow) view of what educational practice should be
concerned with can be brought about through the flooding of educational contexts with this evidence,
assuaging the ‘appetite’ for supposed ‘enlightenment’ amongst school leaders and teachers [34].
There is no room for building the inferential capacity or reflexive objectivity of the professional
community of educational practitioners in this vision, or of ensuring that they have the procedural
capability to assess new claims to knowledge. Instead. what is required of educational practitioners
is submission to an evidence authority (the EEF), which is deliberately located outside of the main
academic community (who might muddle and subvert the debate). Educational practice and the
development of ‘gold standard’ evidence can thus be directed efficiently and effectively towards
a specific purpose: In particular, the raising of measurable pupil attainment (in terms of tests and
examinations) in English schools.
In effect, the EEF model leads to a situation in which evidence is ‘selected’, ‘appropriated’,
and ‘transformed’ (i.e., recontextualised) [40], to meet a specific ‘supervening purpose’ [41] (p. 213).
This purpose has emerged not through a disciplinary community (which might cut across both
academic and professional communities as it does to a greater extent in medicine or engineering),
but through a process of division. It entails a dismissal of the ‘old’ educational academic community,
which is to be superseded by a form of ‘new science of education’ [16], guided by a purpose ultimately
determined by policy makers—the improvement of measurable attainment as understood through
the lens of PISA and other global indicators. Evidence is therefore selected for prominence (and
transferral to school communities via the learning and teaching toolkit) according to a specific
(and highly contested) understanding of the purpose of education. This also risks the concomitant
downgrading and dismissal of: (i) Any consideration of the ‘side-effects’ of the implementation of new
initiatives and strategies based on prominent evidence, and (ii) studies of educational activity which
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are deemed irrelevant or subversive according to the dominant arbiters of evidence (policy makers,
school leaders, and the EEF). Furthermore, this is accompanied by the possibility that very different
forms of knowledge become de-differentiated and judged only for their efficacy in solving specific
problems, as framed by school or system leaders. When teaching practice is ‘consciously informed’ by
‘formal research’, ‘practitioner inquiry’, and ‘school or system-led data’ [42] (p. 155), there is a risk that
once decontextualized from its origins, ‘formal research’ will be considered only when it can be used
to support a desired course of action (as suggested by the school or system data). In Bernstein’s terms,
the official recontextualising field has control of the pedagogic device, reaching up to control the field
of production of educational knowledge [40], and therefore weeding out the (supposedly) irrelevant
and subversive elements of knowledge before they reach the wider educational community and the
school system.
Policy makers who advocate this model of evidence selection may perceive this change as similar
to the transition made in medicine towards a science-based professional discipline from its pre-modern
origins to its current form [43]. In effect, the implicit suggestion is that education, as a ‘pre-theoretical
human practice’ [44] (p. 254), has not developed the scientific knowledge base that other (formerly)
pre-theoretical practices have (i.e., medicine)—the transition has not yet fully been made. While a
lack of a scientific knowledge base in other pre-theoretical human practices (such as religion [44]) may
not be problematic for policy makers, it is problematic in terms of education, as governments want
education to do something. Educational institutions are required to provide the skilled workforces
that are perceived to increase the attractiveness of their economies for industrial investment [25].
Nevertheless, due to the fragmented nature of the educational knowledge community, there are
many academics who are more than suited to speak to these knowledge requirements, focusing on
(narrowly conceived) school improvement and effectiveness, or the learning sciences [16], and in so
doing providing fertile ground for the growth of a new science of education that fits policy agendas.
Here, the fragmented structure of the study of education (in England at least) provides
opportunities for the policy makers to exercise their intent. As Furlong and Whitty have shown,
the study of education contains a range of different knowledge traditions which have different levels
of salience in each national context [16]. In England in particular (but also in different ways in other
Anglophone contexts), the tradition of the Foundation disciplines is itself not cohesive and draws on a
wide range of sociological, philosophical, historical, anthropological, psychological, and comparative
disciplinary work [16]. Much of the knowledge produced by this foundational tradition has for some
time been contested by: (i) Critical and post-modern theories from within academia, and (ii) school
improvement and effectiveness traditions that sit astride the academic, policy maker, and practitioner
communities [45]. The consequence is that it is hard to conceive the study of Education in England
(and in similar ways in the U.S.A and Australia) as a cohesive discipline with a (relatively) distinct
disciplinary community that is capable of maintaining a set of mutually accountable disciplinary
norms that have relevance to the educational knowledge produced for and about practice [46,47].
While some educational knowledge retreats into a disciplinary space and distances itself from practice
problematics, other elements of educational knowledge end up with a taken-for-granted view of
practice problematics as they are constructed by dominant voices (i.e., policy makers, school leaders,
and the EEF). While a fully normative view of educational practice underpinned by an inclusive
disciplinary community could exist for the national tradition in England, it struggles to achieve this
at present. The consequence is that researchers end up playing the policy makers’ games in their
disciplinary spaces in order to maximise their chances of being heard [48,49]. Educational evidence
becomes subject to the logic of the market place, where entities can use resources to maximise their
‘impact’, or simply seek to monopolise or dictate the market (i.e., the EEF). This logic is quite distinct
from the professional disciplinary approach that could underpin the development of systematic
expertise across the educational community and amongst individual practitioners.
However, the situation in England is not necessarily shared elsewhere around the world.
In Scandinavia, Netherlands, Germany, and parts of Eastern Europe, there are educational traditions
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which have historically offered a more coherently ‘Educational’ view of education, including
conceptualisations of educational practice that are distinctly infused with considerations predicated
on more social-democratic understandings of the interface between education, society, and the
individual [16,26,50,51]. In such traditions, which often place concepts such as ‘Bildung’ (in
Germany) or ‘Wychowanie’ (in Poland) to the fore, the role of education is not so easily subsumed
as a midwife to national economic ambition, as it has arguably been in England. This is not to
downplay the considerable contests underway over the future of education in those nations [52].
Nevertheless, how educational practice is conceived and enacted (including by educational
practitioners who often have to attend lengthy periods of formation which involve extensive university
and professional study) remains strongly influenced by these national and supra-national educational
traditions, and such traditions generate normative processes by which claims to knowledge and
professional judgements can be evaluated against the disciplinary body of opinion.
5. Concluding Remarks
While the rise of EIP can be understood as part of the increasing attention paid by governments
to systemic ‘improvement’ in education systems and a focus on teacher quality, it can be also argued
that the lack of a coherent body of educational knowledge in many national traditions enables
governments to exercise control not only of definitions of ‘what works’ in education but also over
norms of educational practice [6,16]. For some policy makers and practitioners, the much-remarked
dislocation between ‘evidence’ and teaching practice in many national contexts can only be solved by
a narrowing of what counts as knowledge alongside a more prescriptive control over what counts as
acceptable educational judgement. However, such an alignment serves to exclude wider educational
purposes and arguably instrumentalises pedagogical relations. At risk, at least in the Anglosphere,
is the very idea of education itself. Meanwhile, as noted above, some continental European countries
maintain traditions that may serve to mitigate such developments, although these traditions are not
without challenge.
But what could be an alternative? Cain discusses experiences of practitioners engaging with
research, and points to the need for ‘space for long, focused discussions’ involving not only the ‘voice’ of
external research but also the voice of colleagues [53] (p. 491). Such practice activities have the potential
to improve the development of mutual understanding and accountability, and the development
of normative criteria by which new claims might be assessed and judged. However, any sense
that this could be detached from the practices that higher education and professional communities
uphold would be problematic. No specialised professional community (medicine, engineering, law,
and architecture as examples) seeks to detach itself from higher education, as there is a recognition that
the socio-epistemic practices of higher education provide a strong guarantor of integrity, truthfulness,
and the most sophisticated manifestations of objectivity (although these are never perfect) [17,54].
Cain’s voice, therefore, as the facilitator of the discussion [53] (p. 489), may thus be crucially important.
What this might suggest, therefore, is the importance for school educational practice to be
conceived as inseparable from higher education practices—the mutual accountability of teachers
should be conceived not just to other teachers but also to the educational academic community (and vice
versa!). A more scholarly teaching profession needs a more scholarly academic community, both with
better understandings of the diverse and yet potentially complementary purposes of education [25,46].
A fuller, more nuanced understanding of education means a specialised understanding that is distinct
from that of a layperson (and yet reasonably accessible to that layperson with guidance and support).
It also requires a space not only for discussion but also a socio-political awareness of how topics
of discussion are selected and transformed, and the possibilities for other discussions about other
topics that might be just (or more) important. That is the beginnings of a road towards a genuinely
knowledge-based professionalism or specialised professional practice in which practitioners (of all
kinds) have more control, and in which specialised knowledge is valued, rather than the current road
offered by EIP and its bedfellows.
Educ. Sci. 2019, 9, 70 10 of 11
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Acknowledgments: The author is grateful to Tim Cain and Bronwen Maxwell for organising the symposium at
the ECER 2018 conference in Bolzano, and to the contributors to the symposium for their feedback and reviews on
this paper.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
References
1. Hager, P. Practice as a key idea in understanding work-based learning. In Learning, Work and Practice: New
Understandings; Gibbs, P., Ed.; Springer: Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2013; pp. 85–103.
2. DiMaggio, P.J.; Powell, W.W. (Eds.) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis; University of Chicago
Press: Chicago, IL, USA, 1991.
3. Rouse, J. Social Practices and Normativity. Philos. Soc. Sci. 2007, 37, 46–56. [CrossRef]
4. MacIntyre, A. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed.; University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame,
Paris, 2007.
5. Hager, P. Refurbishing MacIntyre’s Account of Practice. J. Philos. Educ. 2011, 45, 545–561. [CrossRef]
6. Winch, C. Dimensions of Expertise; Continuum: London, UK, 2010.
7. Carr, W. For Education: Towards Critical Educational Inquiry; OUP: Buckingham, UK, 1995.
8. Nicolini, D. Practice Theory, Work and Organisation: An Introduction; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2013.
9. Schatzki, T. Introduction: Practice theory. In The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory; Schatzki, T.R.,
Knorr-Cetina, K., Von Savigny, E., Eds.; Routledge: Abingdon, UK, 2001; pp. 1–14.
10. Noddings, N. Is teaching a practice? J. Philos. Educ. 2003, 37, 241–251. [CrossRef]
11. Hrdern, J. Differentiating knowledge, differentiating (occupational) practice. J. Voc. Educ. Train 2016, 68,
453–469. [CrossRef]
12. Gibbs, P. (Ed.) Learning, Work and Practice: New Understandings; Springer: Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2013.
13. Lave, J.; Wenger, E. Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation; Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, UK, 1991.
14. Vescio, V.; Ross, D.; Adams, A. A review of research on the impact of professional learning communities on
teaching practice and student learning. Teach. Teach. Educ. 2008, 24, 80–91. [CrossRef]
15. Muijs, D.; Reynolds, D. Effective Teaching: Evidence and Practice, 3rd ed.; Sage: London, UK, 2011.
16. Furlong, J.; Whitty, G. Knowledge traditions in the study of education. In Knowledge and the Study of Education:
An International Exploration; Whitty, G., Furlong, J., Eds.; Symposium: Didcot, UK, 2017; pp. 13–57.
17. Young, M.; Muller, J. Towards the Sociology of Professional Knowledge. In Knowledge, Expertise and the
Professions; Young, M., Muller, J., Eds.; Routledge: Abingdon, UK, 2014; pp. 3–17.
18. Duguid, P. The Art of Knowing: Social and Tacit Dimensions of Knowledge and the Limits of the Community
of Practice. Inf. Soc. 2005, 21, 109–118. [CrossRef]
19. Scutt, C. Editorial: Connecting research and practice. Impact J. Chart. Coll. Teach. 2017, Interim Issue, 2–4.
[CrossRef]
20. Biesta, G. Why ‘what works’ won’t work. Evidence-based practice and the democratic deficit of educational
research. Educ. Theory 2007, 57, 1–22. [CrossRef]
21. Coe, R. Evaluation: Why, what and how. Impact J. Chart. Coll. Teach. 2017, Interim Issue, 7–10.
22. Kime, S. From intentions to implementation: Establishing a culture of evidence-informed education. Impact J.
Chart. Coll. Teach. 2017, Interim Issue, 5–7.
23. Nelson, J.; Campbell, C. Evidence-informed practice in education: Meanings and applications. Educ. Res.-UK
2017, 59, 127–135. [CrossRef]
24. Nelson, J.; O’Beirne, C. Using Evidence in the Classroom: What Works and Why? NFER: Slough, UK, 2014.
25. Spiel, C.; Shwatzmann, S.; Busemeyer, M.; Cloete, N.; Drori, G.; Lassnigg, L.; Schober, B.; Michele
Schweisfurth, M.; Verma, S.; Bakarat, B.; et al. The Contribution of Education to Social Progress. In Rethinking
Society for the 21st Century; International Panel on Social Progress: Paris, France; Princeton, NJ, USA, 2017.
26. Biesta, G.J.J. Good education in an age of measurement: On the need to reconnect with the question of
purpose in education. Educ. Assess. Eval. Account. 2010, 21, 33–46. [CrossRef]
27. Bridges, D. The disciplines and discipline of educational research. J. Philos. Educ. 2006, 40, 259–272.
[CrossRef]
Educ. Sci. 2019, 9, 70 11 of 11
28. Friedson, E. Professionalism: The Third Logic; Polity Press: Cambridge, UK, 2001.
29. Hordern, J. Teaching, teacher formation, and specialised professional practice. Eur. J. Teach. Educ. 2015, 38,
431–444. [CrossRef]
30. Gale, T. What’s not to like about RCTs in education. In Mobilising Teacher Researchers: Challenging Educational
Inequality; Childs, A., Menter, I., Eds.; Routledge: Abingdon, UK, 2018; pp. 207–223.
31. Collins, K. The importance of randomised controlled trials in education. Impact J. Chart. Coll. Teach. 2017,
Interim Issue, 13–16.
32. Department for Education (DfE). DfE Strategy 2015–2010: World-Class Education and Care; DfE: London, UK, 2016.
33. Education Endowment Foundation (EEF). Our mission; EEF: London, UK; Available online: www.
educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/about/history/ (accessed on 15 May 2018).
34. Education Endowment Foundation (EEF). Annual Report; EEF: London, UK, 2017; Available
online: https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/public/files/Annual_Reports/EEF_Annual_
Report_2018_-_print.pdf (accessed on 15 May 2018).
35. Hordern, J.; Tatto, M.T. Conceptions of Teaching and Educational Knowledge requirements. Oxford Rev.
Educ. 2018, 44, 686–701. [CrossRef]
36. Stoll, L. Five Challenges in moving towards evidence-informed practice. Impact J. Chart. Coll. Teach. 2017,
Interim Issue, 11–13.
37. Shalem, Y. What binds professional judgement- the case of teaching. In Knowledge, Expertise and the Professions;
Young, M., Muller, J., Eds.; Routledge: Abingdon, UK, 2004; pp. 93–105.
38. Young, M.; Muller, J. Truth and truthfulness in the sociology of educational knowledge. Theory Res. Educ.
2007, 5, 173–201. [CrossRef]
39. Larrson, M.S. The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis; University of California Press: Berkeley, CA,
USA, 1977.
40. Bernstein, B. Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity; Rowman & Littlefield: New York, NY, USA; Oxford, UK, 2000.
41. Muller, J. Forms of knowledge and curriculum coherence. J. Educ. Work 2009, 22, 205–226. [CrossRef]
42. Brown, C.; Schildkamp, K.; Hubers, M.D. Combining the best of two worlds: A conceptual proposal for
evidence-informed school improvement. Educ. Res.-UK 2017, 59, 154–172. [CrossRef]
43. Foray, D.; Hargreaves, D. The production of knowledge in different sectors. Lond. Rev. Educ. 2003, 1, 7–19.
[CrossRef]
44. Carr, D. Rival conceptions of practice in education and teaching. J. Philos. Educ. 2003, 37, 253–268. [CrossRef]
45. Hordern, J. Bernstein’s sociology of knowledge and education(al) studies. In Knowledge and the Study Of
Education: An International Exploration; Whitty, G., Furlong, J., Eds.; Didcot: Symposium, 2017; pp. 191–210.
46. Hordern, J. Is powerful educational knowledge possible? Camb. J. Educ. 2018, 48, 787–802. [CrossRef]
47. Whitty, G.; Furlong, J. Knowledge and the Study of Education: An International Exploration; Symposium: Didcot,
UK, 2017.
48. Francis, B; Archer, L.; Hodgen, J.; Pepper, D.; Taylor, B.; Travers, M.-C. Exploring the relative lack of impact of
research on ‘ability grouping’ in England: A discourse analytic account. Camb. J. Educ. 2017, 47, 1–17. [CrossRef]
49. Cain, T.; Allan, D. The invisible impact of educational research. Oxf. Rev. Educ. 2017, 43, 718–732. [CrossRef]
50. Hordern, J. Educational knowledge: Traditions of inquiry, specialisation and practice. Pedagog. Cult. Soc.
2018, 26, 577–591. [CrossRef]
51. Hopmann, S. Restrained teaching: The common core of Didaktik. Eur. Educ. Res. J. 2007, 6, 109–124.
[CrossRef]
52. Schriewer, J. Between the philosophy of self-cultivation and empirical research: Educational studies in
Germany. In Knowledge and the Study of Education: An International Exploration; Whitty, G., Furlong, J., Eds.;
Symposium: Didcot, UK, 2017; pp. 75–99.
53. Cain, T. Teachers’ engagement with research texts: Beyond instrumental, conceptual or strategic use.
J. Educ. Teach. 2015, 41, 478–492. [CrossRef]
54. Muller, J. Every picture tells a story: Epistemological access and knowledge. Educ. Change 2014, 18, 255–269.
[CrossRef]
© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
